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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM

&...t~. I

eetober 19~ 1978 Conference
List J-, Sheet 1
No. 77-6949
DUNN (Convicted of making false
statements before grand jury)

Cert to CA 10
(Barrett, Doyle,
& Logan)

v.
UNITED STATES
1.

SUMMARY:

Federal/Criminal

Timely

Petr seeks review of his conviction under 18 U .S.C.

§ 1623 of making false statements before a grand juryo

The government's

case was based on§ 1623(c), which allows the government to make its
case if it proves that two sworn statements are so inconsistent that one

~

of them must be false.

Petr contends (1) that declarations made before

a federal grand jury under a grant of immunity cannot be used to

establi~

I wovkl d.Riil~ ) a,.s rf YlM ~W\rtt~ ~ ~~ h\~ ~~~v~,~~ ~ +e.~h~~
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(

the corpus delect i of an inconsistent declarations prosecution under
§ 1623{c) without it first being established that the immunized decla-

rations were false and
judge that

9~/o

(2) that petr's admission before a federal distric t

of his grand jury testimony was false cannot be relied

upon in sustaining a § 1623 conviction when

th~

only theory presented to

the trial court was one of inconsistent declarations.
2.

STATUTE INVOLVED:

18 U.S.C. § 1623(a} makes it a crime to

knowingly make a false material declaration under oath "in any proceeding
before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States •
§ 1623(c)

provides for situations in which a single witness makes two or

more inconsistent sworn statements:
"(c) An indictment or information for violation
of this section alleging that in any proceeding
before or ancillary to any court or grand jury
of the United States, the defendant under oath
has knowingly made two or more declarations, which
are inconsistent to the degree that one of them
is necessarily false need not specify which declaration is false • •
"
"In any prosecution under this section, the falsity
of a declaration set forth in the indictment or
information shall be established sufficient for
conviction by proof that the defendant under oath
made irreconcilably contradictory declarations
material to the point in question in any proceeding
before or ancillary to any court or grand jury."
Thus, the government need not prove which of the inconsistent declaration
was false through extrinsic evidence/but rather, the falsity of one of
the two declarations is inferred from its inconsistency with the other.
3.

FACTS:

In June 1976, under a grant of immunity pursuant to

- 3 -

18

u.s.c.

§

v
6002, petr presented grand

jury testimony implicating one

Musgrave in illegal drug activity and leading ultimately to Musgrave's
indictment.

In September 1976 petr appeared in the office of Musgrave's

attorney and in the presence of the attorney and a notary
an oral statement

unde~

public gave

oath which was recorded and transcribed in which

he recanted his grand jury testimony implicating Musgrave.

Petr stated

that much of what he had previously told the grand jury was not true.
Armed with these admissions, Musgrave's attorney challenged the indictments charging Musgrave with illegal drug activity.

In an evidentiary

hearing on Musgrave's challenge to the indictments, petr reaffirmed under
oath that he had lied to the grand jury.
I,

In particular, petr stated

that "possibly 100/o" of his grand jury testimony had been true.
Shortly thereafter, petr was charged with five counts of making fals .
statements to a grand jury in violation of § 1623.

Evidence introduced

against petr included excerpts from his testimony before the grand jury,
his testimony in the attorney's office, and his testimony at the Musgrave
found
evidentiary hearing. The jury/petr guilty on three of the five counts.
The CA 10 affirmed.

The court first agreed with petr that the pro-

ceeding in the attorney's office was not a proceeding "ancillary to a
court or a grand jury of the United States," but held that the evidentia r
hearing conducted in the district court on Musgrave's challenge to his
indictment did constitute a proceeding ancillary to the grand jury pro-

V

Section 6002 provides:
"No testimony or other information compelled under
the order may be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury,
giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to
comply with the order."

- 4 ceeding.

In this regard, the court also held that admission into evi-

dence of petr's testimony at the Musgrave hearing did not create a fatal
variance between proof at trial and the indictment.

(The indictment con-

tained excerpts from petr's initial grand jury testimony and from his
testimony in the attorney's office.

It did not contain excerpts from

his testimony at the Musgrave hearing.)

The variance was not fatal

because petr could have anticipated from the indictment what evidence
would be presented at trial.
TheCA 10 next turned to petr's contention that grand jury testimony
~unized

under 18

u.s.c.

§

6002 may not be used to establish the corpus

delecti of a prosecution for inconsistent declarations without a prior
showing of its falsityo

The court distinguished cases cited by petr for

this proposition on the ground that in this case petr's testimony in
the attorney's office and in the Musgrave hearing was not only

inconsiste ~

with his immunized grand jury testimony but also contained an admission
that he had in fact testified falsely before that grand jury.

Petr's

unequivocal admission that his immunized testimony before the grand jury
had been false justified the use of the immunized testimony to establish
the corpus delecti of his § 1623 prosecution.
4.

CONTENTIONS:

Petr contends that theCA lO's decision conflicts

with circuit court decisions holding that immunized testimony may not be
used to establish the corpus delecti of an inconsistent declarations
~

prosecution without a prior showing that the immunized testimony was
false.

He argues that "to compel the defendant on the one hand to testif

- 5 truthfully under an order of immunity thereby setting aside his Fifth
Amendment claim, but on the other hand, prosecuting him for inconsistent
declarations without proving a violation of the immunity order is a
violation of due process and [the defendant•s] Fifth Amendment privilege.~·
Petn. at 10-llo
5.

DISCUSSION:

The cases holding that immunized testimony cannot

be used as the basis of an inconsistent declarations prosecution under
§ l623(c) are the product of§ 1623(c) •s provision allowing the government to make its case without proving which inconsistent statement was
false.

As the CA 7 stated in United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381

(7th Cir. 1976), certo denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977),

·-

~

11

Perjury by incon-

sistent statements must necessarily be shown through the use of the
immunized testimony.

11

Because the government need not show which in-

consistent statement is false, the government may well be violating the
terms of the grant of immunity by using truthful immunized testimony to
prove the falsity of subsequent sworn testimony.

When the subsequent

inconsistent statements contain an admission that the earlier, immunized
testimony was false, however, this reasoning seems to evaporate.

Indeed,

it appears that the government did not need to prosecute this case under
an

11

inconsistent statements .. theory.

It could simply have used petr•s

sworn admission to prove the falsity of the earlier immunized grand jury
testimonyo
There is no response.
I would denyo
10/5/78
CMS

Cooper

CA 10 op in petn.
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Supplemental Memorandum
December 1, 1978 Conference
No. 77-6949

Cert to CA10

DUNN

v.
UNITED STATES

Federal/Criminal

Timely

A response from the SG and petr's reply to that
response have been received, and the case is set for discussion
at the Conference this Friday.
Section 1623(a) makes it a crime to give a material,
false declaration in any proceeding ancillary to a grand jury

2.
proceeding.

§1623(c) eliminates the need for the government to

prove which of two inconsistent statements is false, thereby
allowing a witness to be convicted under §1623(a) if he has made
two contradictory declarations in proceedings anciallary to a
grand jury proceeding.

The SG recognizes that in the instant

case it probably was unnecessary to proceed under the
"inconsistent statements" rubric of §1623(c), as petr had
admitted in sworn testimony that his grand jury testimony had
been false.

Thus, the immunity granted for that testimony was

ineffectual, and the testimony was properly admissible to show
that petr had lied before the grand jury.
The SG maintains, however, that because the government
proceeded against petr under §1623(c), this Court cannot assume
that petr's grand jury testimony was false.

Thus, the SG

co~ cludes tha~~c~a::
s~
e_;p~r~e~s~
e~n~t~s~a~n
~~i~m~p~o-r_.
t ~a-n.t._s.u._
e.s.b
~ion

deserving the Court's plenary review:

whether truthful,

immunized testimony may be used as the partial basis for an
inconsistent statements prosecution under §1623(c).

The

government argues that immunized testimony can be so used
because the immunity extends only to use against the witness
concerning crimes that occurred prior to the giving of the
testimony.

Because the crime involved here was petr's

subsequent perjury, the SG insists that there is nothing wrong
with using immunized testimony (even if truthful) as the partial
basis for the prosecution.

The government contends that,

although there is no direct conflict among the circuits, there
~

3.
is strong dictum in some decisions indicating that some courts
do not agree with the government's position.
Nonetheless, the SG does not ask the Court to grant
certiorari at this time.

Rather, the government asks the Court

to hold this case for the decision in New Jersey v. Portash, No.
77-1489 (to be argued next week).

The issue in Portash, as you

will recall, is whether immunized testimony constitutionally may
be used to impeach a defendant's testimony at his trial for the
crime with respect to which he testified.

Dunn of course

differs importantly from Portash, as in the former the immunized
testimony was used as the basis for a separate perjury
prosecution, whereas in the latter the testimony was used to
help convict the witness of the very crime with respect to which
he testified under the grant of immunit.

The SG contends,

however, that the difference in Dunn means only that, if the
Court affirms the New Jersey decision, the question here will
remain open:

Even if immunized testimony cannot be used with

respect to crimes occurring prior to the giving of the
testimony, it may be useable with respect in prosecuting the
witness for his later perjury.

If the Court were to reverse in

Portash, however, the SG contends that affirmance in the instant

t

case would follow a fortiori.
In his reply, pe·tr reasserts that the proof at his
trial varied substantially from the charges contained in the
indictment, and that this in itself is enough to warrant the
granting of certiorari.

In addition, petr contends that the use

4.
of his grand jury testimony here is prohibited by the terms of
the federal use immunity statute, 18

u.s.c.

§6002.

Under that

statute, immunized testimony can be used only in a "prosecution
for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to
comply with the order."

Petr claims that the structure of the

provision indicates that witnesses' testimony may be used
against them only if they

~

are prosecuted for giving a false

statement and violated the order to give the immunized
testimony.

In the instant case there is no indication that petr

violated the order to testify before the grand jury, and so he
does not fall within the exception.
I suppose that it does no harm to hold this
Portash, as the two cases involve related issues.

ca ~ e

for

Nonetheless,

I question whether the Court should do anything ultimately but
deny certiorari.

Thus, if Portash were reversed (the Court

ruling that immunized testimony could be used to impeach), there
would be no reason to GV&R, as the decision below would follow a
fortiori from the decision in Portash; similarly, there would be
little point in granting plenary review in order merely to say
that this is an easier case than Portash.

If, on the other

hand, Portash were affirmed, the Court would have to decide
whether this is the appropriate case to address the question
raised by the SG.
reasons.
conflict.

It seems to me that it is not for three

First, the SG himself admits that there is no square
Second,

it seems to me that the SG is correct in his

analysis--that is, that the court below reached the correct

5.

result, albeit by somewhat muddied analysis.

Third, I continue

to be troubled by the fact that proceeding under the
inconsistent statements provision of §1623(c) seems to have been
entirely unnecessary in this case:

Petr has twice admitted

under oath that his grand jury testimony was false, and
therefore the immunity qranted should not apply.
11/30
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January 5, 1979 Conference
Supplemental List
Motion for Appointment of
Counsel

No. 77-6949
DUNN

v.
UNITED STATES
Petr asks that Daniel J. Sears, Esq., be appointed . to
represent him.

Mr. Sears represented petr from arraignment

through the cert petn, and was last appointed by CA 10.

He was

admitted to the Colo. bar in 1968, the N. Mex. bar in 1969, and
this Court in 1975.

He was appointed Federal Public Defender

in 1975.
Mr. Sears appears qualified.
1/2/79
sal
--"

Richman
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May 2, 1979

77-6949 Dunn v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
I

Please show on the next draft of your opinion that
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

~tqtrtntt <!fottrt ttf tltt 'Jtlttitttt ~flrlts

1Ulasfringron, gl. <!f. 211pJt;t
CHAMB E RS OF'

JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

May 3, 1979

Re:

No. 77-6949 - Dunn v. United States

Memorandum to the Conference

Please substitute the attached page 2 for
the one in draft 2 circulated today.
Sincerely,

?.M·
T.M.

77--{)940-0PINION

2

DUNN v. Ul"\ITED STATES

of the term ancillary procreding in ~ H323. a phrase not defined in that pro\'ision or elsewhere in the criminal code.
More sprcifically. we must determine whether an interview.
- ·in a private attorney's office at which a sworn statement is
given constitutes a proceeding ancillary to a court or grand
jury within the meaning of the statute.

I

...

On June 16. 1076. petitioner Robert Dunn testified before
a federal grand jury under a grant of immunity pursuant to
18 U. S. C. ~ 6002. 2 The grand jury was investigating illicit
drug activity at the Colorado State Penitentiary where petitioner had been incarcrratccl. Dunn's testimony implicated
a fellow inmate. Phillip :\IusgraYc. in various drug-related
offenses. FollO\Ying petitioner's appearance~ . the grand jury
indicted l\'1 usgra vc for conspiracy to n{';ntifacture and distribute methamphetamine.
ably rontrndirtory drrbration;: matrrial to the point in f]Urstion in any
prorceding beforr or anrilbry to any rourt or grand jnry. Jt, :-:hall Jx. a
de£ense to an indirtmrnt or information madr pursuant to tlw first srntence of thi;; ~ub:;:rrtion that thr defendant at the time he made each
declaration brlien•d thr dPrl.1ration was true."
2 Undrr IS U.S. C.§ 6002:
"Whrnevcr a witne~,; rrfu~r;;, on the basb of hi~ prh-ilrgr against selfincrimination, to t<.':'tify or provide other information m a proceeding
before or ancillary to"(1) a court. or g:rnnd jury of the United States,
"(2) an agrnry of the Unitl'rl Statrs, or
11
(3) either Hou"r of Congrrs;;, a joint committee of the two Housrs, or a
commit.tre or a suhcommittrc of rith<'r Hou;;c,
and the prrson prr~iding ovrr tltr procerding communirntes to the witnrs5
an order i;;surcl unc!rr thi:< 11:1rt, the witnrso< ma~· not. rcfu~c to campi~· ''ith
the ordrr on the ba:<i:; of his privilrgr again:<t ~ elf- incrimination; but no
testimony or ot hrr information compl•lll'<l under t.ht· order (or any information din•ctly or indirC'etl~- drrivrd from such tr:<timony or othrr
information) ma~- bn u"Pd again~! the witnr~s in any criminal ra~e. <·xrept
a prosecution for perjury, giving :.1. fal:<e ~tatrmrnt, or othrrwi~e failing
1o comply with the order,"

.ilt1lTtlttt <!Jcnrlttf tlft 'Jllttittb j;.taft,ll'
~M frittgLnt. ~. <!J. 2ll~Jl. ~ ,

CHAMBERS OF

May 3, 1979

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

Re:

77-6949 - Dunn v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
Although I tentatively expressed a different
view during our Conference discussion, I am glad
to join your opinion for the Court.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

•'

~u:prmtt <!Jaurlaf tfrt ~b ~hrltg
~rur!pngttm:, !l. OJ. 20.;t'!~

May 3, 1979

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE

w ... .

J , BRENNAN , JR .

RE: No. 77-6949

Dunn v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
I agree.
Sincerely,

/~f
Mr. Justice Marshall
cc: The Conference

j

.§npt"tlltt Qflturlltf tlrt ~lt ;§hUtS'
~as'lfin:ghm. ~.
C~ AM BERS

(!}.

2llc?JJ.~

O F"

JUSTICE J OH N P A UL S T EVE N S

May 4, 1979

Re:

77-6949 - Dunn v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

(

;%;uprtutt ~onrt ltf lilt ~nittb .§hmg
~IUlJrittgtlltt, ~. ~· 2llc?)!..;l,
C H AMBE R S O F

JU S TICE HARRY A. BLAC KMUN

May 7, 1979

Re: No. 77-6949 - Dunn v. United States
Dear Thurgood:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc:

The Conference

~u:punu

{!fcurlltf f1rt 'J!fuit.t~ ,jtatts

'Jil'as fringttttt.
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

May 17, 1979

Re:

No. 77-6949 -- Robert Dunn v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
My dissent here will be a silent one -strictly graveyard.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

~uttrtmt {!fottft cf

tlrt ~ttittb ,.§ttdtil

· ._uftingtcn. ~. <!J.

2llgtJ.1~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

May 24, 1979

I

V'
Re:

No. 77-6949 - Dunn v. United States

Dear Thurgood:
My dissent, as Byron's, will be of the graveyard variety.
Please join me.
Sincerely,~-

Mr. Justice Marshall
Copies to the Conference

<qltltrl ttf tltt> ~nittlt ;iftm<~
~~Ulyittgtcn. tB. <!} . .. 2!lgi.l!..;l

..§u.p-r.cm.t

CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMU N

May 24, 1979

/
Re:

No. 78-5072

Davis v. Passman

Dear Bill:
Please join me in your recirculation of May 21.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Brennan
cc:

The Conference

~ttpt"ttttt

<lJottrl of t!tt ~a- ~t~

. :.ufringhtn, ~. QJ. 2ll~'!~
CHAMeERS 01'"

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

May 26, 1979

Dear Thurgood:
Re:

77-6949 Dunn v. U.S.

I join.

Mr. Justice Marshall
cc:

The e onference
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